the ECB proposed by the two Supreme Courts in their case-law, and will explain why the legality of the ECB's activity will be re-examined in the near future.
Introduction
In 2012, in a press release, I the Governing Council of the European Central Bank by the pledge of the Bank's President Draghi to do "whatever it takes" II to save the Eurozone.
The purchasing program was justified by the necessity of reducing the excessive difference between the yields of government bonds of certain Member States (spread), which risked compromising the ECB's transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
Indeed, according to the Bank, the bond yields of certain Member States was not completely dependent upon their economic fundamentals, but also incorporated "redenomination risk premia" (Nordvig 2015) , consisting of the fear of investors about the possible breakup of the Eurozone and the abandonment of the euro by Member States in financial difficulties.
Since government bonds represent an essential instrument in regulating interest rates, their excessive volatility risked compromising the "singleness of the monetary policy"
The German judges decided to follow their controversial but well-established theory of the ultra vires and identity control (Schorkopf 2009 , Mahlmann 2010 , according to which they reserve for themselves the last word on the legality of the acts enacted by European institutions. Through these judiciary locks, the BVerfG aims to review and eventually strike as illegal every "manifest" V violation of the principle of conferral perpetrated by European
Institutions, especially every time the latter might put the fundamental prerogatives of the German Parliament in danger.
The ECJ, deciding in plenary session on the questions referred, did not agree with the view of the BVerfG on the nature of the OMT, considering it in keeping with the monetary competences of the ECB. The European Judges also established that the legal framework enshrined in the press release, including a certain number of limitations, was sufficient to avoid any violation of art. 123 TFEU.
The last chapter of the Gauweiler case was written on 21 June 2016, when the ball was kicked back into the field of the Federal Court, which decided obtorto collo to back the ECJ's decision on the program. The case is important for two reasons. Firstly, because it represents another example of the "European case-law" of the BVerfG (Beck 2011), through which the German Court clarifies, and hopefully improves, its difficult relationship with the ECJ. Secondly, it sheds light on the complex role fulfilled by the ECB during the financial crisis, with the transformation of the Bank from a technocratic institution to a policy maker capable of preventing the breakup of the Eurozone with its unconventional monetary measures.
The present contribution will focus on the case law of the two supreme courts in respect of European Monetary Union, and in particular the action of the ECB. In the first section, it will analyze the first preliminary referral of the BVerfG, contextualizing this decision within the famous European jurisprudence of the Federal Court.
In the second, a similar assessment will be provided for the Gauweiler judgement of the ECJ, which must be read in conjunction with the Pringle case. In the last section, the final decision of the BVerfG will be taken into consideration to demonstrate that irreconcilable interpretations of the extension of the monetary mandate of the ECB are destined to resurface again in the future. 
The monetary mandate of the ECB according to the BVerfG
As is well known, the treaties lay down a clear distinction between the economic and monetary pillars of European Economic Governance, with Member States' sovereignty in fiscal and economic policies coupled with the exclusive competence of the ECB in the monetary field.
The BVerfG's judgment strongly implied that the OMT program was an act of economic policy, therefore outside the monetary mandate of the ECB, because of 1) its objective , 2) the selectivity of the potential purchases and 3) the parallelism with the ESM and the risk to compromise the functioning of the latter.
For point 1), in the Pringle VI case, the ECJ had stressed that the institution of the ESM, created for the financial assistance of Member States in economic distress, was an act of economic policy outside the exclusive monetary mandate of the ECB. The Bank, pursuing the same objective of the ESM with the OMT program, would have promised to perform an act which only Member states have the competence to implement .
At point 2) the German judges also stated that the monetary policies of the ECB cannot have a selective approach, or be differentiated according to the economic situation of single Member States. Differences in the yield of government bonds are entirely due to the economic fundamentals of issuing States, and the ECB must accept that in an open market economy there will always be differences in yields based on market assessments.
VII
Finally, in point 3), the judges stated that the purchases of government bonds implemented by the ECB may compromise the activity of the ESM. The latter is, indeed, provided with limited resources specifically conferred by Member States. The ECB, on the other hand, can issue an unlimited amount of money and therefore it could easily multiply the expenditure envisaged in the aid measure of the ESM. Furthermore, Member States under an adjustment program of the ESM would have no reason to follow the agreement reached with the latter, since they could still count on the better financial assistance provided by the ECB.
VIII
The BVerfG therefore proposed a particularly intense judicial review of the activity of the ECB; and the German judges were not afraid of analysing the motivation provided by the ECB for the program ("the safeguard of the monetary transmission mechanism") and, supported by the technical advice of the Bundesbank, considering it "meaningless". The Court did not accept the analysis formulated by the ECB according to which the spread of certain Member States would be the result of the "redenomination risk", namely the fear of the markets for a possible breakup of the Eurozone. In the blunt analysis of the financial situation endorsed by the BVerfG, "spreads always only result from market participants' expectations and are, regardless of their rationality, essential for market-based pricing".
IX
Trying to level the yields of different government bonds through the OMTs would amount to an illegal intervention in an open-market based economy, which is supposed to selfregulate.
Taking the above into consideration, it is now important to examine why the BVerfG, despite the dissenting opinions of the two most senior judges, X decided to refer a question not only capable of exacerbating the already difficult relationship with the ECJ, but also of compromising the effectiveness of the most effective instrument of financial stabilization in the Eurozone's toolkit.
A brief digression is paramount in understanding why the German Court sees, in the new expansionary measures of the ECB, a departure from the Treaties. The legal framework created at Maastricht to bring discipline to the euro was based on a strong constitutional framework, the ECB was supposed to pursue price stability exclusively, while expansionary monetary policies were not only considered ineffective, but also illegal under the prohibition of monetary financing.
XI
The BVerfG promised to control the future compatibility of the monetary activity of the ECB with the principle of stability in theMaastricht Urteil, XII where the transfer of functions and powers of the Bundesbank to the ECB was considered compatible with the Basic Law only because the latter was constitutionally committed to the "stability paradigm" of prices and budgets (Tuori 2012 , Saitto 2015 . In particular, the institution of an independent European Central Bank was acceptable because it was "inspired by Germany's stability philosophy and only as long as this stability pact was actually respected" (Joerges 2014a).
It is easy to see in this referral a follow-up to the Maastricht Urteil. In order to counteract the effects of the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB decided to adopt expansionary, unconventional measures, which are incompatible with the original, stability-driven philosophy enshrined in the Maastricht economic rules.
It also constitutes further evidence of the "methodological nationalism" (Joerges 
… and according to the ECJ …
The Pringle case was also at the basis of the ECJ's analysis, XX although paradoxically the European judges used it to oppose the BVerfG's arguments rather than confirm them.
According to the Pringle judgment, in order to establish whether an act has a monetary or economic nature is necessary to refer principally to the objectives of the measure and the instruments chosen to attain them. XXI Therefore, if we are to apply this case-law to the OMT Program, we may say that the latter seeks to ensure an "appropriate monetary transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy" (objectives) through the purchase of government bonds in the secondary market (implementing instruments).
XXII
The ECJ states that the monetary policy of the ECB, in order to function properly, must be "single"; therefore, the objective of ensuring an "appropriate monetary transmission" must be considered an objective consistent with the monetary mandate of the ECB.
The European judges also maintain that the Treaties expressly envisage the possibility for the ECB to purchase market instruments in the secondary market, including government bonds (art. 18, ESCB statute), and thus the instrument chosen is also in line with the objectives sought.
XXIII
The ECJ clearly establishes judicial control centered on an analysis of the objectives pursued which is very different from the one proposed by the BVerfG. The European Court, for instance, accepts without further analysis the objectives announced by the ECB in its press release ("the singleness of the monetary policy") as well as the technical analysis underlying the monetary situation of the Eurozone. While the BVerfG is ready to enter in the substance of the ECB's decisions without taking into consideration the risks involved in such a strong judicial review, the ECJ exercises the widest possible degree of judicial restraint, promising to limit its control only to an eventual (and unlikely) "manifest error of assessment." N -10 important margin of appreciation; and the more complex the technical features involved in the monetary assessment are, the broader will be the discretion enjoyed by the bank:
"As regards judicial review of compliance with those conditions, since the ESCB is required when it prepares and implements an open market operations programme of the kind announced in the press release, to make choices of a technical nature and to undertake forecasts and complex assessments, it must be allowed, in that context, a broad discretion." XXV The ECJ, further on in its judgment, correctly points out that the mere announcement of the OMT program was sufficient to attain the objective sought, namely the restoration of the monetary transmission mechanism, and therefore the ECB never purchased any government bond under the legal framework established in the press release. According to the Court, the total lack of implementation is a clear evidence of the proportionality between the objectives and the instruments used by the ECB.
XXVI
The decision of the European judges to leave to the Governing Council a broad margin of discretion is also evident in the motivations, generic and almost tautological, used by the Court to dismiss the most important arguments made by the BVerfG.
Firstly, in the view of the ECJ, the fact that the purchases could indirectly support the financial stability of the Eurozone does not make the OMT program incompatible, in any way, with the monetary mandate of the ECB. The Bank has the competence to purchase government bonds in the secondary market (art. 18, ESCB statute) when in its assessment the singleness of its monetary policy is at risk (1).
XXVII While the BVerfG considers every overlapping effect between monetary and economic policies as an evidence of the violation of the ECB's competences, the ECJ considers it normal given the tight relationship between the two fields.
Secondly, the ECJ states that the treaties do not prohibit the ECB's implementation of monetary policy characterized by selectivity. Although conventional monetary measures are usually directed at the Eurozone as a whole, this does not mean that the bank cannot carry on a program whose effects are directed at selected Member States (2). Within the Eurozone there will always be differences in the yield of government bonds of different Member States, and such spread will always constitute an obstacle to the singleness of the monetary policy of the ECB. As long as the ECJ accepts the objective formally announced by the ECB without engaging in further analysis, also empowering the bank with a broad margin of discretion in the implementation, the judicial review of the bank's activity will always be nothing more than a necessary formalism.
In addition to the light form of judicial review applied, it is also relevant to stress another element of this judgment, namely the absence of any constitutional analysis on the role of the ECB. The ECJ's decision to refrain from broadening the spectrum of its judicial analysis was probably a necessary choice in order to defuel the potentially explosive nature 
The last chapter of the OMT saga
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The choice of the Federal Court confirmed its reputation of a supreme court which "barks, but never bites" (Weiler 2009), accepting the ECJ's ruling according to which the OMT Program would be perfectly compatible with EU Primary Law. In particular, the BVerfG declared inadmissible the questions directly concerning the ECB press release, whilst the questions regarding the omission perpetrated by the Bundestag, the German Government and the Bundesbank were deemed admissible, but unfounded.
The Federal Court strongly criticized the reasoning of the ECJ, but obtorto collo decided to accept its jurisdiction on the ECB's action. According to the Federal Court, indeed, the judicial control promised by the ECJ would be insufficient to preserve the principle of conferral (art. 5 TEU). Taking the objectives declared by the ECB for granted without further analysis would be a de facto authorization to the bank to self-determine its own competence.
XXXVII
The BVerfG also criticized the decision of the ECJ to accept the objective of the restoration of the monetary mechanism, considered by the Federal Court as a justification of convenience for the action of the Bank.
XXXVIII In addition, the BVerfG gave its comment on the constitutional role of the ECB, reaffirming its status of institution sui generis, which constitutes an exception to the fundamental democratic principle protected by the German Constitution.
XXXIX
According to the BVerfG, the independence of the ECB constitutes an exception to the fundamental principle of democracy, established in the German Constitution (art. 38
and 20 of the Grundgesetz). Nevertheless, such an exception is justified because an independent central bank represents the best possible instrument to attain price stability.
The democratic principle, according to which every political decision must derive from the demos, represented in Germany by the Bundestag, can be derogated only "as long as" the ECB pursues exclusively the stability of prices. However, the justification underlying the "suspension" of such a principle is no longer considered feasible when the ECB adopts unconventional monetary programs such as the OMT, capable of producing relevant effects on the public budgets of Member States.
As already stated in the order of referral, the judges could not accept that the ECJ empowers so much competence to an institution acting outside the democratic arena, pleading for a stricter judicial review on the monetary activity of the Bank. Unfortunately, though, the decision of the German judges does not appear to be the result of a sincere preoccupation over the future of the Eurozone, but rather seems a natural consequence of the lack of juridical jurisdiction.
Although in fact the BVerfG has judicially created a complex system to evaluate the legality of EU secondary law, XLIII it does not have any jurisdiction over EU institutions; the BVerfG has jurisdiction only over German national institutions, such as the Bundestag and the German Government.
The problem of the BVerfG is that these institutional actors do not in turn have any In addition, even the strongest and most controversial political resolution from the Bundestag would have zero effects on the monetary activity of the ECB.
The only feasible option for the BVerfG was to empower the Bundesbank with a "responsibility for integration", namely the responsibility to actively prevent any manifest transgression of competences by the ECB. As stated before, such responsibility was actually a judicially created excuse to influence the process of European integration, rendering the participation of the Bundesbank in the OMT program conditional to the respect of the "stability philosophy" of the Maastricht Urteil. It is easy to see the dichotomy between the ECB before the crisis, whose actions were exclusively based on price stability, and the ECB after the crisis, focused on financial stability.
As long as the BVerfG does not accept the constitutional mutation of the Bank and the abandonment of the "stability philosophy" of the Maastricht Urteil, there will always be constitutional clashes between the German and the European Court.
It is likely that this broad divergence in the interpretation of the monetary mandate of the bank will reappear in the near future, since another expansive and unconventional monetary program of the ECB, the c.d. Quantitative Easing, L has also been challenged before the BVerfG.
Are supreme courts the best actors to limit the increasing power and decision-making of the ECB? The overwhelming role fulfilled by the bank during the on-going crisis has raised concern among scholars and politicians alike. The Bank has even been considered as the "heir of the ECJ" LI in promoting European integration at the expense of more democratic actors.
Although these concerns are well founded, it is necessary to take into consideration two elements. Firstly, the ECB has undoubtedly taken the driving seat in counteracting the effects of the euro-crisis, but its monetary behavior does not seem to present any element of originality if compared to the monetary policies of other major central banks; as the Fed, XVII Weber, the President of the Bundesbank, resigned openly criticizing the new course of the ECB. Weidmann, the current President, openly advocated the illegality of the bond-purchasing programs of the ECB, even pleading in front of the BVerfG against the OMT: "secondary markets purchases in my understanding should, however, not aim at reducing the solvency risk premiums of specific States. For that would risk among other things to knock out the disciplining role of market rates and undermine individual responsibility for financial policy." Translation provided by Borger 2016. See also Wagstyl 2016. XVIII The analysis of the procedural requirements to challenge an EU act deemed ultra vires before the BVerfG clearly lies outside the scope of this contribution. An explanation concerning the loosening of the national criteria to challenge EU acts before the German Constitutional Court to the extreme, creating a semi-actio popularis, can be found in Garditz 2014. XIX The author is aware of the possible risk of over semplification of the complex doctrine of the ultra vires and constitutional review of the BVerfG. Nevertheless, it is difficult to not see in this doctrine (and especially in this referral) the attempt of the BVerfG to control the process of European Integration. XX 
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matters to politics without caring about the democratic legitimacy of political decision-making". XXXII For a legal analysis of solidarity in the euro-crisis see Borger 2013a. XXXIII The ECB has always attached to its rescue monetary measures a strict conditionality, using its unconventional policies to pressure member states in financial distress towards acceptance of structural reforms. For an analysis of the first, implicit conditionality see Beukers 2013. For a study of the second, explicit conditionality expressly attached to the OMT and the QE programs, see Viterbo 2016. XXXIV Defining such broad and complex interdisciplinary principle is an herculean task which will not be attempted here. For the difficulties of defining the exact characteristics of financial stability see Borger 2013b. XXXV XLVII Cfr art. 14 (3) of the Statute of the ESCB and ECB. Cfr Baroncelli 2016. "The German Central Bank is a member of the Governing Council of the ECB, and it is not only independent from the electorate by definition (in particular from the German Parliament), but it is also an integral part of the ESCB and should act in accordance with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB. It is true that the Bundesbank voted the adoption of the OMT programme within the Governing Council, but once a measure has been adopted on the basis of a majority, the rule of law should apply". XLVIII Cfr Zilioli 2016: "Indeed, in accordance with Article 12(1) of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB, Eurosystem operations are carried out in a decentralized way, subject to the assessment by the Governing Council of the possibility and appropriateness of decentralization. Part of this assessment concerns the modalities of decentralization: it is not always necessary, nor efficient, to have all NCBs participating in all Eurosystem operations. This is why, for example, in the running of the platforms of Target2 and T2S, in the production of the various cuts of banknotes, in the management of the foreign reserves of the ECB, some NCBs, and not all, carry out these operations on behalf of the whole Eurosystem." XLIX Cfr Peroni 2013, according to which the ECB would have become during the crisis "the new central hub of economic policies". L Decision ECB/2015/10 of 4 March 2015 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme, [2015] OJ L 121/20. LI Scicluna 2013.
